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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
______________ 
 
No. 14-4325 
______________ 
 
CLARENCE B. THOMPSON, 
             Appellant 
 
v. 
 
KELLOGG’S USA 
  ______________ 
 
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 
(D.C. No. 4:12-cv-02528) 
District Judge: Hon. Matthew W. Brann 
______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
July 17, 2015 
______________ 
 
Before: SMITH, GREENAWAY, JR. and SHWARTZ, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: July 20, 2015) 
______________ 
 
OPINION 
______________ 
 
SHWARTZ, Circuit Judge. 
 
 Clarence B. Thompson appeals from the District Court’s grant of summary 
judgment in favor of Kellogg’s USA (“Kellogg”) on Thompson’s retaliation claim under 
                                                 
 This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
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Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (“Title VII”), and the 
Pennsylvania Human Relations Act, 43 Pa. Con. Stat. Ann. § 951 (“PHRA”).  We will 
affirm. 
I 
 Thompson worked at Kellogg’s bakery in Muncy, Pennsylvania, operating the 
machines that mix icing for Pop-Tarts.  A Collective Bargaining Agreement (“CBA”) set 
forth the terms and conditions of Thompson’s employment and the “Plant Work Rules” 
provided for progressive discipline for infractions.  App. 123. 
 Thompson used a computer screen and checklist to perform his icing mixing 
duties.  A computer screen prompted Thompson to send hot water into the icing mixer 
and to add gelatin, a thickening agent.  The machine automatically added sugar to the 
icing mix.  Once the computer screen signaled that the blending of hot water, gelatin, and 
sugar was complete, Thompson had to press a button to send the icing into a separate 
holding tank.  Thompson was responsible for ensuring that the holding tank was not 
empty.   
During Thompson’s April 27, 2011 shift, an icing holding tank ran out of icing 
and another holding tank nearly emptied, causing the operations on the Pop-Tart line to 
stop.  Kellogg operations supervisor Lori Buss investigated the incident.  When she 
arrived at the icing mixing area, she saw Thompson sitting on a chair leaning against a 
bag of gelatin while lights blinked on both of the icing mixers, which indicated that an 
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employee needed to prompt the computer to take the next step in the mixing process.  
Buss summoned a second supervisor to determine whether Thompson was sleeping. 
Buss later spoke to two other employees about the incident.  One employee told 
Buss that he believed Thompson was sleeping during his shift when the Pop-Tart line 
went down.  Based on her investigation, Buss believed that Thompson fell asleep.  
Thompson conceded that the icing holding tank became empty during his shift, but he 
denied sleeping, and maintained that the tank was “not full” when his shift began and 
would not stay full because “[t]hey were running so fast.”  App. 418.   
Thompson was suspended for three days and received a “final Group II written 
warning,” App. 126, which omitted any reference to sleeping and cited his “serious 
neglect of work” for “[f]ail[ing] to complete steps in the process and allow[ing the] icing 
tank to empty causing 13 min[utes] of [down time],” App. 64.  The warning also stated 
that any additional infractions would lead to “further disciplinary action up to and 
including termination.”  App. 64.   
Several weeks after he returned to work, Kellogg employee relations manager 
Chris Boschi called Thompson into her office to speak with him about an insulin shot 
Thompson had administered to himself in a hallway sanitation closet.  During this 
conversation, Thompson asked Boschi why the company did not “hire more black 
people?” and stated “not to be indignant or anything like that, but you have seven, eight, 
nine hires, and not one employee is black.”  App. 420.  Boschi wrote down Thompson’s 
concerns, said she would pass them along to a Kellogg human relations manager, and 
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invited Thompson to make an appointment to further discuss his concerns.  Thompson 
never did so.   
Thompson also testified that during an earlier conversation with Boschi, he asked 
her “about bringing some diversity training or diversity meetings back to” the Muncy 
bakery in light of racial slurs Thompson allegedly heard while working at the bakery.  
App. 420.  Thompson recalled raising similar concerns with other members of Kellogg’s 
management team at various times and that they “would tell [him,] don’t give up on your 
ideas.”  App. 436. 
 Several months later, on August 19, 2011, a batch of icing Thompson prepared 
had to be discarded because the icing was too thin.  Although Thompson reported on the 
mixing worksheet that he had added gelatin to this batch of icing, he later admitted that 
he had not done so.  His misreporting of the gelatin on the mixing worksheet violated 
Kellogg’s mixing procedures and cost the company in “scrap” and downtime.  App. 63.  
As a result, and in light of the “final Group II written warning” he had received for the 
April 27th incident, App. 126, Kellogg terminated Thompson. 
 Thompson contested his termination through the CBA’s grievance process.  
During the process, Kellogg and his union signed a “Last Chance Agreement” allowing 
Thompson to keep his job.  App. 128, 175.  The Last Chance Agreement provided, 
however, that Thompson would be terminated if he violated any work rules within the 
following 12 months, “regardless of circumstances.”  App. 65.   
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 Six weeks after he signed the Last Chance Agreement, Thompson committed 
another work rule violation.  On October 17, 2011, Thompson was assigned to place 
malic acid into individual plastic containers, label each container with the name of the 
corresponding product, and complete a worksheet with information that included the 
name of the ingredient and the date it was packaged.  Although Thompson placed the 
malic acid into 75 individual containers, he failed to label any of the containers or to date 
the worksheet.  As a result, on October 31, 2011, Kellogg issued Thompson a written 
warning for failing to label the malic acid containers and for failing to include required 
information on the worksheet and terminated Thompson.   
 Thompson explained that he did not complete the worksheets or label the 
containers because a Kellogg supervisor directed him to “help out” another line that “was 
having problems.”  App. 459.  Thompson told the supervisor, “I’m not done here yet,” to 
which the supervisor responded, “don’t worry about that.”  App. 459.  
 Thompson also testified that, as an icing mixer, he regularly received malic acid 
containers without labels and that Kellogg did not typically throw away those containers 
simply because they were not labeled.  Kevin Glenn, another Kellogg employee, testified 
that while supervisors sometimes attempted to track down where unlabeled items came 
from in order to put labels on them, the unlabeled items were “usually” “throw[n] . . . 
away.”  App. 486.  Glenn, who had worked for Kellogg since 1993, could not recall any 
time a Kellogg employee was terminated for failing to label an item.   
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 Following his termination, Thompson brought this action against Kellogg claiming 
race discrimination and retaliation under Title VII and the PHRA.  The District Court 
adopted the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation that Kellogg’s motion for summary 
judgment be granted, and Thompson appeals.   
II1 
 Thompson appeals the grant of summary judgment on only his retaliation claim 
under Title VII and the PHRA.  “A prima facie case of illegal retaliation requires a 
showing of (1) protected employee activity; (2) adverse action by the employer either 
after or contemporaneous with the employee’s protected activity; and (3) a causal 
connection between the employee’s protected activity and the employer’s adverse 
action.”  EEOC v. Allstate Ins. Co., 778 F.3d 444, 449 (3d Cir. 2015) (quoting Fogleman 
v. Mercy Hosp., Inc., 283 F.3d 561, 567 (3d Cir. 2002)).  As to causation, the employee 
must show that the employer’s “desire to retaliate was the but-for cause of the challenged 
employment action” such that “the unlawful retaliation would not have occurred in the 
                                                 
 1 The District Court had jurisdiction over Thompson’s Title VII claims under 28 
U.S.C. § 1331 and supplemental jurisdiction over Thompson’s PHRA claim under 28 
U.S.C. § 1367.  We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
 We exercise plenary review of the District Court’s grant of summary judgment.  
Daniels v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 776 F.3d 181, 192 (3d Cir. 2015).  Summary judgment is 
appropriate where “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).  A disputed issue is 
“genuine” only “if there is a sufficient evidentiary basis on which a reasonable jury could 
find for the non-moving party.”  Kaucher v. Cnty. of Bucks, 455 F.3d 418, 423 (3d Cir. 
2006).  We view the facts and draw all reasonable inferences in the non-movant’s favor. 
Hugh v. Butler Cnty. Family YMCA, 418 F.3d 265, 266–67 (3d Cir. 2005). 
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absence of the alleged wrongful action or actions of the employer.”  Univ. of Tex. Sw. 
Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2528, 2533 (2013).2    
 “To establish the requisite causal connection[,] a plaintiff usually must prove 
either (1) an unusually suggestive temporal proximity between the protected activity and 
the allegedly retaliatory action, or (2) a pattern of antagonism coupled with timing to 
establish a causal link.”  Lauren W. ex rel. Jean W. v. DeFlaminis, 480 F.3d 259, 267 (3d 
Cir. 2007).  On this latter point, we generally “look to the intervening period for 
demonstrative proof, such as actual antagonistic conduct or animus against the employee, 
. . . inconsistent reasons given by the employer for terminating the employee[,] or the 
employer’s treatment of other employees.”  Marra v. Phila. Hous. Auth., 497 F.3d 286, 
302 (3d Cir. 2007).  Here, Thompson does not challenge the Magistrate Judge’s 
conclusion that the temporal proximity between his protected activity and suspension or 
termination was not unusually suggestive of retaliatory animus.  Instead, Thompson 
contends that there “is ample evidence in the record to infer a causal connection” between 
his comments about diversity training and hiring practices and his suspension and 
termination.  Opening Br. 12.   
 The record, however, does not support this contention.  Thompson conceded that 
the “only” evidence supporting his position that Kellogg terminated him because of his 
comments was his own “belief,” App. 437, and that he has no knowledge of who at 
                                                 
2 We apply the same legal standards to Thompson’s PHRA claim.  Jones v. Sch. 
Dist. of Phila., 198 F.3d 403, 409 (3d Cir. 1999).   
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Kellogg made the decision to terminate him.  Further, the October 17th incident 
immediately preceding his ultimate termination occurred months after his comments to 
human resources and after Kellogg agreed to reinstate him pursuant to the Last Chance 
Agreement, which expressly provided: “[a]ny work rule violation, regardless of 
circumstances, during the lifetime of this agreement will result in immediate 
termination.”  App. 65; see, e.g., Krouse v. Am. Sterilizer Co., 126 F.3d 494, 504 (3d Cir. 
1997) (affirming summary judgment on Title VII retaliation claim where employer, after 
placing Krouse on worker’s compensation leave, returned Krouse to previous position 
“after Krouse filed his EEOC charge”).  Notably, this Last Chance Agreement was 
tendered after he raised his concerns about Kellogg’s practices and the need for diversity 
training.  Kellogg’s willingness to continue Thompson’s employment after his comments 
undermines any link between his comments and his termination, as his comments were in 
fact followed by reinstatement.  On this record, therefore, we conclude that Thompson 
failed to introduce “demonstrative proof” of retaliatory animus or other circumstances 
suggesting that his termination was a result of Kellogg’s retaliatory animus.   
 Thompson’s assertions that he “was given inconsistent reasons by [Kellogg] with 
respect to his May 10, 2011 warning” and “received more swift and harsh punishment 
than Caucasian employees who continued to be employed,” Opening Br. 15, do not 
change this conclusion.  As to “inconsistent reasons,” Thompson relies on the fact that 
the Kellogg supervisor who investigated the April 17th incident did not record on the 
written warning that Thompson may have been asleep.  The supervisor testified that she 
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omitted this information because Thompson had awakened by the time a second Kellogg 
manager arrived at the scene.  Even if the supervisor was mistaken about Thompson 
sleeping, such a “mistaken apprehension,” absent specific evidence that the reason for the 
omission was retaliatory, “does not automatically transform” that actor’s motivation into 
a retaliatory one.  Lauren W., 480 F.3d at 270 (finding decisionmaker’s “mistaken 
apprehension” regarding an event involving plaintiffs “unpersuasive” as evidence of 
retaliatory animus where plaintiffs “failed to put forth even one specific fact to support an 
inference that [decisionmaker] took her actions in retaliation”).  If anything, the absence 
of any reference to a belief that Thompson had been sleeping militates against an 
inference of retaliatory animus as it omitted negative information about Thompson.  In 
any event, Kellogg’s explanation for suspending and subsequently terminating 
Thompson, given the undisputed evidence that he failed to perform his duties three times 
between April and October 2011 and violated the Last Chance Agreement, “is not so 
inconsistent or incongruous” as to raise an inference of a retaliatory animus.  LeBoon v. 
Lancaster Jewish Cmty. Ctr. Ass’n, 503 F.3d 217, 234 (3d Cir. 2007).   
 Similarly unavailing is Thompson’s claim that he “received more swift and harsh 
punishment than Caucasian employees.”3  Opening Br. at 15.  Generally speaking, a 
                                                 
3 Thompson’s brief also discusses testimony from “other African American 
employees [that] . . .  painted a picture of the racially discriminatory atmosphere” at 
Kellogg.  Opening Br. 15.  While this discussion may have been probative on his 
abandoned race discrimination claim and provided support for the views he shared with 
human resources, it does not establish his claim that he was fired for speaking out about 
Kellogg’s hiring practices and need for diversity training. 
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plaintiff claiming “that he was disciplined by his employer more harshly than a similarly 
situated employee based on some prohibited reason . . . must show that he is similarly 
situated with respect to performance, qualifications, and conduct,” which “normally 
entails a showing that the two employees dealt with the same supervisor, were subject to 
the same standards, and had engaged in similar conduct without such differentiating or 
mitigating circumstances as would distinguish their conduct or the employer’s treatment 
of them.”  Radue v. Kimberly–Clark Corp., 219 F.3d 612, 617–18 (7th Cir. 2000).  While 
Thompson contends that other Kellogg employees made “major mistakes” without being 
terminated, Opening Br. 20, and that other African American employees “have made race 
discrimination complaints against Defendant,” Opening Br. 21, he produced no evidence 
that these employees held similar positions, had similar disciplinary records, were subject 
to a Last Chance Agreement, or reported to the same decisionmakers when they made 
these mistakes or complaints.  Thus, Thompson has failed to identify any similarly 
situated comparator and so the treatment of these other individuals does nothing to 
advance his retaliation claim.  See, e.g., Lauren W., 480 F.3d at 269 (finding that 
plaintiff–student’s comparison to other students “did not have evidentiary value on the 
retaliation issue as they were not similarly situated”).   
III 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
